We provide a simple characterization of updating rules that can be rationalized as Bayesian. Namely, we consider a general setting in which an agent observes nite sequences of signals and reports probabilistic predictions on the underlying state of the world. We study when such predictions are consistent with Bayesian updating, i.e., when does there exist some theory about the signal generation process that would be consistent with the agent behaving as a Bayesian updater. We show that the following condition is necessary and su cient for the agent to appear Bayesian: the probability distribution that represents the agent's belief after observing any nite sequence of signals is a convex combination of the probability distributions that represent her beliefs conditional on observing sequences of signals that are the possible continuations of the original sequence. This condition cannot be derived from the ones the literature has identi ed when confounding the problem with maximization of expected utility. Additional restrictions are required if all histories of signals are to be given positive probability under the identi ed information generation process.
1. Introduction
Overview
The assumption that agents use Bayesian updating to revise beliefs in light of new evidence is ubiquitous in the social sciences. De Finetti (1937) was one of the rst to attempt tying underlying statistical rules an agent may be following to their behavior (using some of Ramsey's 1931 interpretations of probabilities as subjective). The 70 years that followed provided an abundance of inquiries focusing mostly on observables tying information to behavior and assessing jointly when these observables may be rationalized as coming from Bayesian updating and maximization of some expected utility. Consequently, the extant work confounds conditions for Bayesian behavior with some form of optimization. The goal of the current paper is to identify conditions for a prediction rule, a mapping from information into stated beliefs, to be consistent with Bayesian updating.
To x ideas, consider a simple example in which an agent is given lists of attributes of a person called Bob and required to make a prediction on the probability Bob is an engineer.
Suppose the agent is told that Bob is 6 feet tall, or 6 feet tall and wearing glasses, or 6 feet tall and not wearing glasses, etc. If we could elicit responses for all such questions, when could we nd some belief tying engineers and non-engineers to attributes that make the agent's reports look as if they were deduced using Bayes rule?
1 Certainly, if the agent reports 80% probability of Bob being an engineer when Bob is said to be 6 feet tall and wearing glasses, and 70% if Bob is 6 feet tall and not wearing glasses, then the agent cannot be a Bayesian and report, say, 50% probability of Bob being an engineer when the only information she gets is that Bob is 6 feet tall. In fact, if the agent has some joint probability in mind tying attributes and professions, it better be the case that knowing only that Bob is 6 feet tall leads to a prediction that is in between 70% and 80%.
More generally, consider an agent who, provided any nite sequence of signals, is asked to report a prediction { a probability distribution over some underlying state space, which represents her beliefs conditional on observing that sequence of signals. We say the agent behaves as a Bayesian whenever there exists some (probabilistic) theory tying states to signal realizations based on which a Bayesian updater would make identical predictions to our agent.
In other words, the agent is indistinguishable from someone using Bayes rule with that theory.
The example above then generalizes directly. Whenever the agent behaves as a Bayesian, it must be the case that for any sequence of signals, the corresponding predictions are within the convex hull of the predictions corresponding to all continuations of that signal sequence. Our main result illustrates that this condition is, in fact, also su cient for the agent to behave as a Bayesian.
The proof of our result is simple and constructive in nature. We nd a consistent sequence of marginal distributions corresponding to realizations of nite sequences of signals. When the signal sequences can persist inde nitely, we can extend the sequence of distributions (using Kolmogorov's Extension Theorem) to a distribution tying any sequence of signals to a belief on the underlying states of the world (which is an arbitrary Borel space, nite or in nite).
While the type of experiment required to identify Bayesian behavior is gedanken in nature, it is worth noting that our results can easily be restricted to questionnaires pertaining only to nite sequences of signals. Furthermore, even if signal sequences are potentially in nite, non-Bayesian behavior will be identi ed in nite time using our characterization result.
Even when one has access to partial responses of the sort described above there are still consistency requirements that the available responses must satisfy in order to be indistinguishable from those of a Bayesian updater. Namely, Theorem 2 illustrates the following consistency requirement. Consider the sequence of signals s 1 ; s 2 ; ::: We could describe the potential realizations as a tree in which the root corresponds to no information, branching out to nodes that correspond to di erent realizations of s 1 , each branching out to nodes corresponding to the realizations of s 2 ; and so on. At each node we can put the prediction belief, if it is available. Take any sub-tree of the tree in which the leaves have speci ed predictions.
Similar to the description above, it is rather straightforward to show that a Bayesian updater must be consistent within the sub-tree. That is, any speci ed prediction on the root of the sub-tree must be within the convex hall of all predictions in the leaves of the sub-tree. As it turns out, this is also a su cient condition.
One may also worry about the plausibility given the deduced theory of some of the signal sequences that our framework requires posing to agents. In particular, the deduced theory that makes an agent indistinguishable from a Bayesian updater may potentially place zero probability on some signal sequences. We identify additional restrictions assuring that this is not the case. Namely, for any sequence of signals, the corresponding predictions need to be within the relative interior of the convex hull of the predictions corresponding to all continuations of that signal sequence.
Utility considerations are (intentionally) absent in our analysis. However, we would like to stress two points. First, the question of when an agent is Bayesian is not subsumed in the analysis pertaining to expected utility by a Bayesian updater (see the literature review below for a more elaborate comparison).
2 Second, elicitation of beliefs could be thought of as elicitation of actions when payo s are speci ed in a particular way (see O erman, Sonnemans, van de Kuilen, and Wakker, 2006, and references therein).
Related Literature
De Finetti's theorem (see de Finetti, 1937 , and a recent overview by Cifarelli and Regazzini, 1996) explained why exchangeable observations are conditionally independent given some (usually) unobservable quantity to which an epistemic probability distribution can be assigned.
It crystallized the di erences between Bayesian and frequentist methods in statistical inference.
Indeed, frequentists often treat observations as independent while Bayesians treat them as exchangeable. Savage (1954) and Anscombe and Aumann (1963) opened the door for assessing when observed behavior may arise from some form of expected utility maximization in which the agent possesses subjective probabilities over states. In a way, our approach can be thought of as identifying a subjective signaling structure that can explain agents' behavior as arising from Bayesian updating.
The literature that followed suit is immense in scope and we shall therefore not attempt to cover it in full. Broadly speaking, the underlying model that literature focuses on takes mappings from information into actions as the atom of observation and considers the conditions under which these mappings may be consistent with Bayesian updating together with maximization of (some) expected utility (see, e.g., Green and Park, 1996). El-Gamal and Grether (1995) , who identify several behavioral strategies subjects use when confronted with incentivized updating tasks.
Structure of the Paper
In the following section we spell out the model. Section 3 describes the main result for nite signal spaces and a complete set of predictions. The section also provides the proof as it is rather simple and instructive. Section 4 extends the result to situations where an arbitrary subset of observations is available, while Section 5 extends the result to a general setting in which signals are taken from an arbitrary set ( nite or not). Section 6 considers the case in which the identi ed Bayesian updating rules are restricted to place positive probability on all signal pro les. Section 7 brie y discusses the implications one can draw from our analysis to a set formulation of the problem. Section 8 concludes. Technical proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
The Model
Let K be a Borel space 3 of states of nature and let S be a nite set of signals. We denote by S the set of all nite sequences of elements of S:
S n : For = (s 1 ; : : : ; s n ) 2 S and s n+1 2 S we denote by s the element of S given by (s 1 ; : : : ; s n ; s n+1 ).
An updating rule is a function : S ! (K). Before de ning the concept of Bayesian updating rules, we recall the notion of a discrete conditional distribution: Let P be a Borel space, : P ! X a measurable function over P with values in some nite set X, and let be a probability measure over K P . Then there exists probability measures ( jx) over K for every x 2 X such that for every Borel subset B of K one has
where K is the marginal distribution of over K:
and X is the marginal of over X:
Slightly abusing notation, we will omit the subscripts K and X corresponding to the marginal distributions K and X and denote them by . Thus we write the last equation in the following way
The probability distribution ( jx) is called the conditional distribution over K given x and is uniquely determined whenever (x) > 0.
In our setup, P = S 1 is the Borel space of in nite sequences of signals, X = S n is the nite set of sequences of length n; and : P ! X is the natural projection given by 
Main Result
Our main result establishes a necessary and su cient condition for an updating rule to be
Bayesian. This condition is rather simple and intuitive to phrase. for every s 1 ; : : : ; s n 2 S such that (s 1 ; : : : ; s n ) > 0, where Conv stands for the convex hull.
2.
If (3) is satis ed for every s 1 ; : : : ; s n 2 S then is Bayesian.
Remark (Observing Actions) An action can be thought of as a bounded Borel function
u : K ! R. Every probability measure 2 (K) induces a preference relation over For every pair u; v of actions, if
If, whatever signal will arrive tomorrow, the agent will prefer action u to v then she prefers action u to v today.
We now prove Theorem 1. While necessity follows almost directly, su ciency is slightly more challenging. The idea is to construct a consistent sequence of marginal distributions which we then extend using Kolmogorov's Extension Theorem. Formally, Proof. Assume rst that is Bayesian. Let be a probability measure over K S 1 such that (2) is satis ed.
For every n and every s 1 ; : : : ; s n+1 we have, by the de nition of conditional probability in 
We now de ne, for every n; a probability measure n over K S n as follows where the rst and third equalities follows from (5) and the second equality follows from (4).
Therefore, the marginal distribution of n+1 over K S n is n . It follows from Kolmogorov's Extension Theorem that there exists a probability over K S 1 such that the marginal of over K S n is n . In particular, substituting B = K in (5) where the second equality follows from (5) and (6), and the fact that n is the marginal of over K S n . By the uniqueness of the conditional probabilities it follows that [s 1 ; : : : ; s n ](B) = (Bjs 1 ; : : : ; s n ) as desired.
As can be expected, the identi ed distribution (formally, ) is not necessarily determined uniquely. Our result addresses the broader question regarding whether, observing agents' predictions, we can reject the hypothesis of them updating using Bayes rule.
We will refer to an updating rule : S ! (K) as sound if it satis es (3) That is, the agent weighs the correct posterior with her previous prediction. It is straightforward to show that~ would, in fact, be sound. In particular, it would be indistinguishable from Bayesian updating (with a prior di erent than ).
4
Learning. It follows directly from the de nition of Bayesian rules that :
Bayesian if and only if there exists some probability space ( ; A; P) and random variables : ! K and 1 ; 2 ;
: ! S such that [s 1 ; : : : ; s n ](B) = P( = k; 1 = s 1 ; : : : ; n = s n ) P( 1 = s 1 ; : : : ; n = s n ) ;
for every s 1 ; : : : ; s n such that P( 1 = s 1 ; : : : ; n = s n ) > 0. The probability measure appearing in our analysis above corresponds to the joint distribution of ; 1 ; 2 ; : : : . 4 If signals were assumed to be conditionally independent, an equally sensible model for stickiness would be one in which current belief reports are a convex combination of last period's reports and a Bayesian posterior based on these reported beliefs and the current signal. Such a model would generate predictions indistinguishable from Bayesian updating as well.
Note that in general we cannot assume that is measurable with respect to 1 ; : : : ; n , i.e., that the agent is asked to provide her prediction about her future observation, since in this case the agent will eventually learn the state { that is, her predictions will converge to an extreme point of (K). However, the soundness condition of Theorem 1 does not guarantee learning. As an example, consider the case in which K = f0; 1g, so that a prediction can be summarized by a number corresponding to the assessed probability that the state is 1: Assume is a convergent sequence { it converges to the agent's prediction \at in nity." However, these predictions need not be deterministic as shown by the above example.
Experimentation. If one entertains testing whether an individual is a Bayesian updater experimentally, one may nd the prospects of presenting the potential subject with all signal sequences in S daunting. An immediate response that follows from our main result is that an agent that is non-Bayesian will violate Theorem 1's condition of soundness for some n; and therefore be detected as non-Bayesian in nite time.
Beyond that, the construction in our proof translates directly when considering only nite sequences of signals bounded in length. Speci cally, we have the following immediate corollary:
Corollary (Finite Experimentation) Suppose we restrict the domain of to S T n=0 S n for some integer T . Then is Bayesian if and only if the (soundness) condition in Theorem 1 is satis ed for 0 n < T . The measure over K S T that explains in this case is the measure T constructed in Theorem 1's proof.
In the following section we consider a generalization of Theorem 1 regarding the case in which only partial (and arbitrary) predictions are observed.
Bayesian statistician or Bayesian economic agent. According to the de nition of
Bayesian updating rules in Section 2, a Bayesian agent has a belief over K S 1 and updates his beliefs over K using the observed signals. However, the term Bayesian is often used in the statistics literature in a more restrictive sense, where it is also assumed that the the measure is such that the signals s 1 ; s 2 ; : : : are independently identically distributed given the state of nature (often called the parameter) k. The intuition is that s 1 ; s 2 ; : : : are samples from some distribution that depends on the parameter k. The statistician has some prior belief over the true parameter that governs the distribution of the sample, and she updates her belief given the observations. As the following example shows, the framework of this paper, which allows an arbitrary belief over K S 1 , gives rise to updating rules which are strange from the point of view of Bayesian statistics:
Example Assume that K = S = f0; 1g. Then (K) can be identi ed with the interval [0; 1], where an element p 2 [0; 1] stands for the probability measure over K that assigns probability 1 p to 0 and probability p to 1. Consider the updating rule given by (s 1 ; : : : ; s n ) = and therefore is Bayesian according to our de nition.
Degrees of Freedom
Consider an updating rule that is de ned over sequences of signals of length up to T , i.e., :
Note that the number of degrees of freedom for specifying such is (jKj 1)
. On the other hand, the number of degrees of freedom available for specifying a belief over K S T is jKj jSj If jKj > jSj then the the set of Bayesian updating rules has smaller dimension than the set of all updating rules, which means that the condition in Theorem 1 restricts the dimension of .
Note that the number of (non-linear) degrees of freedom corresponding to a measure which corresponds to i.i.d signals given the state of nature (according to the statistics paradigm) is jKj (jSj 1), which is much smaller.
Partial Observations
In many situations, it may be di cult to access the full range of predictions corresponding to all signal sequences and one may observe an arbitrary set of predictions. Those are, of course, still subject to some consistency restrictions in order to be explained as the outcome of a Bayesian updating process. The focus of the current section is the identi cation of these general restrictions.
Formally, we now assume that is de ned over an arbitrary subset A of S . Again, we ask whether can be derived from a Bayesian updating rule. In other words, we inspect when can be extended to S in such a way as to satisfy the condition presented in Theorem 1.
It is useful to view S as the set of nodes of an in nite tree: The root is the empty sequence, and the immediate successors of a node (s 1 ; : : : ; s n ) 2 S are all the elements (s 1 ; : : : ; s n ;s n+1 ); wheres n+1 2 S. A sub-tree is given by a pair (r; L) where r 2 S and L S is a set of successors of r such that any branch of S that passes through r passes through a unique element of L. r is the root of the sub-tree and L is the set of its leaves. we say that a sub-tree (r; L) is contained in A if r 2 A and L A.
The following simple example illustrates some of the notation and the condition required for consistency with Bayesian updating.
Example 1 Consider the case in which S = fu; dg and K = f0; 1g so that a prediction can now be summarized by one number (say, the probability that the state is 1). Suppose further that predictions are available only for
(so, in particular, there is no prediction available for the revelation s 1 = d). Figure 1 illustrates two such scenarios, where numbers in each node correspond to the available predictions and shaded circles correspond to missing observations. The two panels di er The example generalizes directly. In fact, Theorem 2 illustrates that the necessary and su cient condition for to be extended to a Bayesian updating rule over S is that for each sub-tree that is contained in A; the prediction at the root is within the convex hull of the predictions in the leaves. Formally, Theorem 2 (Partial Observations) Let K be a Borel set of states of nature, S a nite set of signals, A S and : A ! (K).
1. If can be extended to a Bayesian updating rule over S and the probability mea-
for every sub-tree (r; L) that is contained in A and such that (s 1 ; : : : ; s n ) > 0 where r = (s 1 ; : : : ; s n ).
2. If (7) is satis ed for every sub-tree (r; L) that is contained in A then can be extended to a Bayesian updating rule over S .
The formal proof of Theorem 2 is omitted, as it is a direct application of Theorem 1.
Indeed, the necessity of the condition follows immediately from the type of arguments used to prove Theorem 1. To prove su ciency, we restrict S to nite trees and consider all minimal sub-trees that are contained in A: These are sub-trees that contain no other sub-tree contained in A. Each such sub-tree can be completed in a consistent manner, as in the example. We then look at the resulting (extended) prediction and repeat the procedure until all nite predictions are completed in a manner consistent with Theorem 1's prediction. We can then use an extension to S to utilize Theorem 1.
General Signal Space
Our analysis thus far allowed for arbitrary state spaces but restricted the signals to be taken from a nite set. In this section we extend our main result to general signal spaces. The di culty arising from continuous signal spaces can be easily seen: The condition of Theorem 1 ensured that for any sequence of signals (s 1 ; :::; s n ) ; the prediction is a convex combination of the predictions corresponding to all continuation signal sequences (s 1 ; :::; s n ;s n+1 ) : The weights placed on each such prediction, denoted by (s n+1 ; s 1 ; :::; s n ) in the proof of Theorem 1; were not determined uniquely. In order to repeat the construction of the original proof, and end up with an admissible measure, we need to make sure we select (s n+1 ; s 1 ; :::; s n ) in a way that makes it measurable with respect to all its arguments. When S is discrete this is, of course, immediate as any selection will be measurable.
For a Borel space X we denote by (X) the Borel space of all Borel probability measures over X. For 2 ( (X)), the barycenter of is the unique element [ ] of (X) such that
for every bounded measurable function h : X ! R. Note that if is a discrete probability, In the general setting, the barycenter of a set of distributions over K will replace the convex hull in Theorem 1 (note that if A is nite then BC(A) is the convex hull of A). then is Bayesian.
The proof of the theorem relies on results on selection of measurable functions and appears in the Appendix.
Plausibility of Signal Sequences
In principle, our main result does not rule out situations in which the derived distribution places zero probability on some sequences of signals (that our hypothetical subject may face in the experimental questionnaire). Indeed, consider the following example:
Example 2 Assume that K = S = f0; 1g. Then (K) can be identi ed with the interval [0; 1], where an element p 2 [0; 1] stands for the probability measure over K that assigns probability 1 p to 0 and probability p to 1. Consider the updating rule given by (s 1 ; : : : ; s n ) = s 1 + + s n n ; and () = 1 2 :
It is easy to verify that it satis es the condition in Theorem 1. The corresponding probability measure over K S 1 is an atomic probability with two mass- according to such a sequence has probability 0.
In order to guarantee that every nite sequence 2 S has a strictly positive probability, we need to ensure that the numbers (s n+1 js 1 ; : : : ; s n ) are strictly positive (recall (6)). To achieve this, we have to replace the Convex Hull in Theorem 1 with its relative interior. 
Event-Based Predictions
One natural direction for generalization of our analysis could come from discarding the sequencing aspect inherent in our model of signal observations. That is, one could contemplate predictions that are based on arbitrary subsets of some underlying space representing the information the agent can receive. As we show in this section, a condition analogous to the soundness conditions we identi ed in the signaling model is necessary but not su cient in such a set formulation of the problem.
Formally, let P be a Borel space and let I be a family of Borel subsets of P . Assume that we are given a function : I ! (K). As before, for 2 I, we denote by [ ] the image of under . We say that is Bayesian if there exists some probability distribution over 6 The relative interior of a convex set X is its interior within its a ne hull (the minimal set containing all a ne combinations of points in X). When, as in our case, X is a polygon, the relative interior of X contains all the points that do not belong to a face of X:
P ( ) for every 2 I and every Borel subset C of K, where P is the marginal of over P . Note that the right hand side of the last equation is the conditional probability (under ) of C given . The model of Section 2 is a special case, where P = S 1 and I is the set of all cylinders of the form (s 1 ; : : : ; s n ) S 1 for some s 1 ; : : : ; s n 2 S 1 . In the general setting of this section we do not assume that the information is given by a dynamic process of signals .
The soundness condition in Theorem 1 can be adapted to a necessary condition for to be rationalizable by in the general model:
If ; 1 ; : : : ; n 2 I and =
However, without further assumptions on I the condition is not su cient, as shown by the following example:
Example Let K = f0; 1g so that a prediction can be summarized by a number (the probability that the state is 1) and let P = fa; b; cg. Assume that The reader can verify that these predictions satisfy the above conditions. However, they cannot be rationalized by any as the following argument suggests: Consider the directed graph whose nodes are the elements of I with an arrow from 2 I to 2 I if ( and there exists no 2 I such that ( ( . If the graph is a forest (i.e., has no cycles) then it is a union of trees, and we can carry out the proof of Theorem 1 going from the root to the leaves on each tree. One can verify that the graph being a forest is equivalent to the condition that for every 1 ; 2 2 I, either 1 2 or 2 1 or 1 \ 2 = ?. Note that in the special case of Section 2 the graph is a tree and the condition is satis ed.
Conclusions
The paper identi ed a simple condition for an updating rule to be indistinguishable from Bayesian updating. The essence of the condition pertains to the e ects of additional information. It is simple enough to identify a non-Bayesian updater in nite time. It is general enough to encompass environments with arbitrary state and signal spaces. It also extends nicely to situations in which only partial responses to information are observable.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 3.
The proof requires the following measurable selection result ( rst proven by Robert J.
Aumann, appearing as Theorem 14.3.2 in Klein, 1984) . As usual, we use the term graph of a correspondence F from X to Y to denote the set f(x; y)jy 2 F (x)g. Proposition (Measurable Selection) Let X; Y be Borel spaces, and let F be a correspondence from X to Y such that the graph of F is a Borel subset of X Y , and let 2 (X). Then there exists a -measurable map f : X ! Y such that f (x) 2 F (x) for -almost x 2 X.
As in Theorem 1, the argument for necessity is similar to that of the nite case. Indeed, x s 1 ; : : : ; s n . After observing a sequence s 1 ; : : : ; s n of signals, a Bayesian agent has a probability distribution over S which re ects her prediction regarding the next signal s n+1 she will receive. Given s n+1 , the agent will update her prediction over K to Naturally, 0 is concentrated on the set f [s 1 ; : : : ; s n ; s n+1 ]js n+1 2 Sg, and, moreover, the Bayesian updating rule dictates that the barycenter of 0 be equal to [s 1 ; : : : ; s n ].
We now prove su ciency. For every s 1 ; : : : ; s n , by the assumption of the theorem there exists a probability measure 0 over ( (K)) which is concentrated on f [s 1 ; : : : ; s n ; s n+1 ]js n+1 2
Sg such that the barycenter of 0 is [s 1 ; : : : ; s n ]. We will use the following lemma (appearing as Corollary 18.24 in Aliprantis and Border, 2006. We provide a short proof here for the sake of completeness).
Lemma Let X; Y be Borel spaces and let g : Y ! X be a surjective measurable map, and let 0 2 (X). Then there exists 2 (Y ) such that g( ) = 0 .
